News

Twiddling thumbs on Somali piracy

October 30, 2008 Edition 1

Helmoed Romer Heitman

Piracy in Somali waters is enjoying a boom: This year, more than 60 attacks had occurred by mid-October, of which at least 30 resulted in a ship being taken.

Most of those have been ransomed, with the total variously estimated at between $18-million (about R183-million) and $35-million, either way an amount that goes a long way in Somalia.

At that point Somali pirates were holding 11 ships and more than 200 seamen for ransom.

This has brought a rather belated naval response:

  • France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada deployed frigates to escort the ships chartered by the World Food Programme to take supplies from Kenya to Somalia, and intend to continue doing so.

  • The Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), an international force currently comprising ships from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the UK and the US, has added anti-piracy operations to its mandate, establishing a "maritime security area" in the Gulf of Aden. French, German and US ships of CTF-150 have on several occasions responded to pirate attacks, driving off the pirates and in at least two incidents arresting some of them.

  • French warships and special forces of France's Indian Ocean Command have recaptured two ships from pirates and have arrested pirates on several other occasions.

  • Spain has deployed a P-3 Orion long-range patrol aircraft to Djibouti, from where it is patrolling the Gulf of Aden area.

  • Malaysia deployed a frigate and a landing ship with several helicopters and a force of commandos to the area when several ships of a state-owned shipping company were taken in September.

  • India deployed a frigate to the Gulf of Aden after a bulk carrier with 18 Indian citizens among its crew was taken by pirates in September, and has a frigate in the area currently to escort Indian-owned ships.

  • France has deployed two corvettes to the Gulf of Aden to conduct "scheduled" East- West patrols, giving ships the option to sail in company for protection.

  • The European Union has established a "piracy cell" to co-ordinate measures to protect ships in the Gulf of Aden, and is planning to deploy a task force to the area towards the end of the year.

  • Nato has deployed a task force to the Gulf of Aden (two destroyers from Italy and the Netherlands, four frigates from Germany, Greece, Turkey and the UK, and a German navy support ship). Norway has announced its intention to make one of its new Nansen class frigates available for this mission early in 2009.

    The joint operations have created challenges such as who actually has jurisdiction. And merely escorting ships and chasing off pirates is not a long-term solution.

    Even a medium-term solution will require forces put on shore to clean out the pirate's bases, much as was necessary in dealing with the Barbary Corsairs some 200 years ago.

    The long-term solution, of course, is to stabilise Somalia.

    For the time being, we can expect extended naval activity in the Gulf of Aden and, to a lesser extent, off Somalia's east coast as the major maritime trading nations move to protect their free use of the sea routes in the area.

    None of this should be all that surprising: Some 20 000 ships transit the Gulf of Aden every year, carrying, among other cargo, 11% of the petroleum products transported by sea. The alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope can add two weeks to a one-way trip, seriously increasing the overall cost.

    Any interruption of the sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden must, therefore, sooner or later draw a response by the world's main trading nations. Also, of course, continued success by the pirates would bring the real danger of piracy expanding into the northern Indian Ocean.

    What is disappointing is that Africa is doing nothing to help.

    African leaders like to complain that they are not taken seriously by the major powers, and it is true that they are not.

    However, the failure of Africa to respond in any way at all to the piracy problem in Somali waters is a very good example of why they are not taken seriously: Africa all too often does nothing to help itself, let alone others.

    It is true that most African countries have extremely small navies that simply lack the capability to deploy elements to Somalia. It is also true that some of those with larger navies have other problems to occupy them. Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria are cases in point.

    Libya, for its part, has a fairly substantial navy but has long lacked personnel to operate all of its equipment.

    However, two African countries have the naval capability to do something useful, have a very real interest in safe sea routes, and yet have failed to do anything at all: Egypt and South Africa.

    Egypt has the largest navy in Africa and a large navy by any standards: 6 frigates, 4 light frigates, 4 submarines, and 10 modern fast attack craft, as well as a large number of older and smaller vessels, supported by a small number of coastal patrol aircraft.

    Egypt also has three medium-sized landing ships that would be well-suited to the role of offshore base for special forces teams used to recapture ships.

    And Egypt earns some $500-million per month from ships using the Suez Canal, about 5% of its total economy.

    So piracy in the Gulf of Aden is definitely a matter of concern for Egypt.

    Yet Egypt does not appear to have so much as considered deploying ships or aircraft to assist in countering the piracy in the very sea lane that leads to its Suez Canal.

    South Africa, for its part, has by far the largest economy in Africa (almost a quarter of the entire continent's economic activity), is one of the top 30 economies in the world, is among the top 12 international maritime trading nations, accounting for about 6% of world seaborne trade, and depends on seaborne trade for about 90% of its foreign trade.

    A proportion of that trade passes through the Gulf of Aden, to and from Europe and elsewhere, and a high proportion of South Africa's imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf in tankers that must pass by Somali waters en route to the Mozambique Channel and South African ports.

    This inaction is not due to a lack of capability.

    The navy has a fleet composition that would allow South Africa to:

  • Deploy a frigate with its Lynx helicopter and either a boarding party from the Maritime Response Force or a team of Special Forces operators from 4 Special Forces Regiment (or both).

  • Deploy SAS Drakensberg as a command and support ship for two strike craft, with helicopters, fast interceptors and Maritime Response Force and/or Special Forces teams embarked in Drakensberg.

  • Include a submarine, which would give the ability to monitor activities in known pirate ports undetected, and to insert a Special Forces team covertly as part of a hostage rescue operation.

    It is past the time to put our ships where our mouth is. - Independent Foreign Service

  • E-mail this article Print this article

    National

    Africa

    World